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International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia
On November 28, 2006, the ICTY
Appeals Chamber partially reversed the Trial
Chamber’s holding concerning local Bosnian
Serb politician Blagoje Simic´. The Trial
Chamber had found that Simic´ participated
in a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) designed
to persecute non-Serbs in northern Bosnia
through detention in inhumane conditions,
torture, and sexual assault. On October 17,
2003, the Trial Chamber sentenced Simic´ to
17 years imprisonment. In contrast, the
Appeals Chamber found that Simic´’s trial had
been unfair because he had not been informed
of the JCE allegation until after the
Prosecution rested its case. While the Appeals
Chamber also reversed his conviction for per-
secution in so far as it was based on cruel and
inhumane treatment, it upheld Simic´’s con-
viction for aiding and abetting persecution
based on the unlawful detention of non-
Serbs, detention in inhumane conditions, and
forced labor and displacement. The
Chamber’s reversals resulted in a reduction in
Simic´’s sentence to fifteen years.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber sentenced
Stanislav Galic´, a commander of the Bosnian
Serb Army’s Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (SRK),
to life imprisonment on November 30, 2006.
The Court delivered the maximum penalty
for the first time after confirming Galic´’s role
in a campaign of sniper attacks and artillery
bombardment intentionally directed at
Sarajevo civilians from 1992 to 1994. The
Chamber dismissed all 19 grounds of appeal,
including his claim of wrongful conviction for
“acts of threats of violence the primary pur-
pose of which was to spread terror among the
civilian population.” Galic´ was found to have
had the intent to terrorize the civilian popula-
tion of Sarajevo. The trial of his successor as
commander of the SRK, Dragomir Milosevic,
began on January 11, 2007, at the ICTY.
On December 8, 2006, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber granted Vojislav Seselj’s appeal
against the Trial Chamber’s imposition of
stand-by counsel. Due to his obstructionist
and disruptive behavior, the Trial Chamber
had decided on August 21, 2006, to assign
counsel to Seselj. That decision was over-
turned by the Appeals Chamber on October
20, 2006. Contemporaneous with that order,
the Appeals Chamber warned Seselj that the
Trial Chamber could assign counsel if he used
his right to self-representation to “substan-
tially obstruct the proper and expeditious pro-
ceedings.” On October 25, 2006, the Trial
Chamber assigned stand-by counsel to per-
form a variety of functions in  Seselj’s defense.
The Appeals Chamber based its reversal on
the Trial Chamber’s failure to establish that 
Seselj had engaged in further obstructionist
behavior or to provide him a true opportunity
to prove that he understood the procedural
requirements necessary to represent himself. 
Seselj subsequently announced that he would
end a hunger strike that he began on
November 11, 2006. After an examination of
Seselj by the Tribunal’s doctor, the trial was
suspended until his health permits him to
effectively represent himself. 
Former Bosnian Serb soldier Dragan
Zelenovic´ pled guilty to seven counts of tor-
ture and rape as crimes against humanity on
January 17, 2007. The plea agreement
describes Zelenovic´’s participation in a wide-
spread and systematic attack on the village of
Foáa. There, in July 1992 a group of Bosnian
Muslim women and children were arrested,
detained and interrogated. Zelenovic´ admit-
ted to raping and torturing some of the
detainees, as well as aiding and abetting rapes
and torture committed by other perpetrators.
His plea agreement requested a sentence
between seven and ten years imprisonment,
while the Prosecution advised a sentence of
ten to fifteen years.
On November 14, 2006, the Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina convicted Radovan
Stankovic, its first Rule 11 bis indictee trans-
ferred from the ICTY. The transfer is part of
the overall completion strategy for the
Tribunal. The Court found Stankovic guilty
of rape and other crimes against humanity,
and sentenced him to 16 years’ imprison-
ment. The indictment charged that in 1992
Stankovic was in charge of a house in Foca,
Bosnia, where Muslim women and girls were
captured so that Serbian soldiers and men
could rape them. An ICTY press release noted
that the judgment “justifies the [ICTY]’s
strategy of transferring cases, expertise and
know-how to the judiciaries in the region,
and particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
The ICTY Referral Bench also ordered that
Vladimir Kovacevic be handed over to the
Republic of Serbia so that authorities can
determine the appropriate court for his trial.
As with Stankovic, the referral was part of the
ICTY completion strategy, and the case was
referred in accordance with Rule 11 bis. The
ICTY Trial Chamber, however, previously
found Kovacevic incompetent to stand trial,
so his prosecution does not appear imminent.
International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda
On December 6, 2006, former pastor
Elizaphan Ntakirutimana completed his sen-
tence of ten years’ imprisonment and was
released from prison. In February 2003,
Ntakirutimana was found guilty of aiding and
abetting genocide and, on appeal, guilty of
aiding and abetting extermination as a crime
against humanity. The Trial Chamber found
that Ntakirutimana had ordered the removal
of Murambi Church’s roof in Bisesero region,
which exposed the Tutsi sheltering in the
church and facilitated their murders.
Ntakirutimana was the first ICTR convict to
be released after completing his sentence.
Ntakirutimana died six weeks after his release
at the age of 83.
A Roman Catholic priest, Athanase
Seromba, was found guilty of genocide and
extermination as a crime against humanity on
December 13, 2006. Seromba was in charge
of a church that provided refuge to some
2000 Tutsis. The Chamber found that
Seromba had the church bulldozed and
ordered that all who tried to escape be shot.
Seromba was acquitted of a different charge of
conspiracy to commit genocide. Thus, he was
sentenced to only 15 years in prison, plus a
credit for the four years already served. The
relatively short sentence prompted the
Prosecutor to appeal the verdict as well as
other aspects of the judgment. Seromba is the
first priest to be tried at the ICTR.
Trial Chamber II accepted a revised guilty
plea on December 14, 2006, from former
businessman and youth organizer Joseph
Nzabirinda. The initial indictment of
Nzabirinda, nicknamed “Biroto,” charged
him with genocide, conspiracy to commit
genocide, extermination as a crime against
humanity, and rape as a crime against human-
UPDATES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
1
Rushing et al.: Updates from the International Criminal Courts
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2007
ity. Although the Prosecution argued that
Nzabirinda was “an approving spectator” dur-
ing attacks, it withdrew some of the charges
plead in the 2001 indictment because of a
lack of evidence. Furthermore, the Defence
agreed that while Nzabirinda was not a phys-
ical perpetrator of the crimes, he was liable as
an accomplice. The new indictment and the
plea agreement charge Nzabirinda with one
count of murder as a crime against humanity.
Prosecutor v. Jean Mpambara,
Case No. ICTR-01-65-T
On September 11, 2006, the ICTR Trial
Chamber delivered its judgment in Prosecutor
v. Jean Mpambara. Jean Mpambara, the for-
mer bourgmestre of Rukara Commune, was
charged with genocide or complicity in geno-
cide and extermination as a crime against
humanity for attacks on Tutsi refugees in
Rukara Commune over a period of several
days in April 1994. Mpambara denied all alle-
gations and insisted that he had attempted to
maintain security and protect the refugees.
The Prosecution withdrew the complicity
count in its closing brief. The Trial Chamber
found Mpambara not guilty on the remaining
counts and called for his immediate release
from the custody of the Tribunal.
Mpambara was not alleged to have physi-
cally participated in the attacks, but to have
participated in a joint criminal enterprise
(JCE) to destroy the Tutsi racial or ethnic
group throughout Rwanda and to have
ordered, instigated, and aided and abetted the
crimes. The Trial Chamber found that, in
some of its submissions, the Prosecution
sought to prove “criminal responsibility for
commission by aiding and abetting the phys-
ical perpetrators in furtherance of a JCE.” The
Trial Chamber described that statement as
“legally incoherent,” noting that aiding and
abetting is a form of accomplice liability,
whereas participation in a joint criminal
enterprise is a type of direct commission of a
crime with other persons. As stated by the
ICTY Appeals Chamber in Kvocka et al., “it
would be inaccurate to refer to aiding and
abetting a joint criminal enterprise.” The Trial
Chamber therefore decided to “consider
whether the material facts show either that the
Accused participated in a joint criminal enter-
prise, or that he aided and abetted others in
the commission of crimes.”  
The Prosecution also alleged that as
bourgmestre Mpambara had a duty under
Rwandan law to prevent and punish criminal
acts. Liability for failing to discharge a legal
duty requires proof that an accused is bound
by a specific legal duty to prevent a crime, that
the accused was aware of and willfully refused
to discharge this legal duty, and that the crime
took place. Although the Prosecution pro-
vided evidence supporting these allegations in
its closing brief, because neither the indict-
ment nor the pre-trial brief identified the
source or scope of Mpambara’s legal duty, the
Trial Chamber determined that he had not
been given reasonable notice of the charge
and that no conviction could be entered on
this basis. 
The case against Mpambara revolved
around three sets of events over a six-day
period in 1994: looting and killing of Tutsi
residents of Gahini Secteur on April 7 and 8;
an attack on Gahini Hospital on April 9; and
attacks on April 9 and 12 at the Parish church
of Rukara. Much of the evidence against
Mpambara was circumstantial. In assessing
whether circumstantial evidence proves a con-
clusion “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the Trial
Chamber applied the standard adopted by the
ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Mucic et al.
judgment: 
It is not sufficient that it is a reasonable
conclusion from that evidence. It must
be the only reasonable conclusion avail-
able. If there is another conclusion
which is also reasonably open from that
evidence, and which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused, he must
be acquitted. 
The killings on April 7 and 8 in Gahini
Secteur stemmed from attacks on the homes
of five Tutsis. The attackers surrounded each
home, broke down doors, killed anyone
inside the house and looted whatever objects
could be found. On April 8 instructions were
given by Jean Bosco Butera, a civilian, for
more killings and the attackers were divided
into four groups, which proceeded to “ravage”
a portion of Rukara Commune for the
remainder of that day. The Trial Chamber
found that “the evidence [left] open the rea-
sonable possibility that Mpambara was over-
whelmed by the situation” in Gahini Secteur,
that he did not know with any certainty who
was leading the attacks, and would have been
incapable of restoring order with the law
enforcement resources at his disposal. The
uncorroborated testimony of Prosecution
Witness AVK alleged that Mpambara insti-
gated the killing of Tutsis on April 7 at
Akabeza Centre and attended a meeting dur-
ing which attacks were planned. However, a
more credible witness contradicted this testi-
mony, leaving reasonable doubt that
Mpambara had criminal intent or contributed
to the attacks.
The morning of April 9, Gahini Hospital
was surrounded and attacked by a mob armed
with “clubs, spears, machetes, and other tradi-
tional weapons.” Refugees had begun to seek
refuge at the hospital between April 7 and 8,
and by April 9 there were between 20 and 50
refugees waiting for assistance on the steps of
the hospital’s main building. Mpambara
arrived at the hospital compound sometime
after the attack, and there was evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt “that after [his]
departure, Interahamwe invaded the hospital
compound a second time and killed Tutsi
refugees.” There was conflicting witness testi-
mony about Mpambara’s role in the attacks.
Mpambara testified that he left the chief of
communal police and gendarmes at the hospi-
tal, “plead[ing] with them that they should do
everything they can to make sure that no one
else is killed in that place.” The Trial Chamber
found that the evidence did not show that
Mpambara actively participated in, encour-
aged, was present during, or deliberately failed
to stop the attack. 
Beginning on April 7, refugees from
Rukara commune began to gather at the
Rukara Parish church. Defence witness Father
Ganuza Lasa Santos testified that “nature
itself had gone silent” as thugs roamed the
streets of Rukara Commune and people
boarded up their homes. By April 9 there were
approximately 3,000 refugees at the church
compound, about 900 of whom were chil-
dren. In the late afternoon of April 9, groups
of “civilians armed with machetes and a few
grenades, allegedly distributed by gen-
darmes,” attacked the church, killing numer-
ous people. By the late afternoon of April 12,
the refugees were barricaded inside the
church. That night the Parish was attacked
again, and any refugees who tried to escape
were beaten to death with clubs or hacked to
death with machetes. By morning, between
one and two thousand Tutsi men, women and
children had been massacred.   
There was uncorroborated testimony that
Mpambara instigated the attack and distrib-
uted grenades and stones to the attackers.
However, Father Santos testified for the
Defence that “at all times” Mpambara
demonstrated a “commitment to defend the
refugees .… [H]e didn’t want to see anyone
else being killed.” Although he indicated that
he wanted to leave he said, “I am the
bourgmestre and I have to stay.” According to
Santos, Mpambara “could see himself being
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accused as a bourgmestre and felt powerless
because of the situation. He felt like fleeing in
order not to be involved but, on the other
hand, he felt obliged to stay — in order to live
up to his responsibilities.” The Trial Chamber
found that the evidence that Mpambara con-
tributed to the attack was “weak, discon-
nected, and uncorroborated.” 
Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi,
Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T
On September 12, 2006, the ICTR Trial
Chamber delivered its judgment in the case of
Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi.  Muvunyi
was indicted on five counts—genocide, or
alternatively, complicity in genocide, direct
and public incitement to commit genocide,
and rape and other inhumane acts as crimes
against humanity. These charges were based
on events that occurred in the Butare prefec-
ture between April and June 1994. The Trial
Chamber found Muvunyi guilty on all counts
with the exception of complicity in genocide,
which was charged in the alternative of geno-
cide, and the crime against humanity of rape,
based on evidentiary grounds. After consider-
ing various aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors, the Trial Chamber sentenced Muvunyi
to twenty-five years imprisonment. 
The Trial Chamber determined that
Muvunyi held the Office of Commander of
Ecole de sous-officiers (ESO). Relying on the
ICTY Appeal Chamber’s holding in Celebici,
the Trial Chamber found that absence of a
formal appointment, as was the case for
Muvunyi, is not fatal to the finding of supe-
rior criminal responsibility so long as the de
facto superior exercises effective control over
his subordinates. As ESO commander,
Muvunyi was “the most senior officer and
commander on the ground with power and
authority to make day-to-day operational
decisions.” As a consequence he was found 
to have exercised effective control over ESO
soldiers during the period of April to mid-
June 1994. 
Muvunyi was found individually responsi-
ble for aiding and abetting genocide for delib-
erately refusing to prevent an attack by ESO
soldiers on Tutsi refugees at the Groupe sco-
laire. By virtue of Muvunyi’s position of
authority as the most senior military officer in
Butare, the proximity of the ESO Camp to
the Groupe scolaire, the repeated nature of the
attacks, and Muvunyi’s instructions to protect
one Tutsi family from harm, the Chamber
determined that he could not have been
unaware that his subordinates were commit-
ting genocidal acts. Although there was no
evidence that Muvunyi directly engaged in
the attack, the Trial Chamber found that his
overall conduct substantially contributed to
the crime. For example, he implicitly permit-
ted a large number of his subordinates to leave
the ESO camp fully equipped with ammuni-
tion to attack unarmed refugees. Additionally,
his selective treatment of the refugees was
found to amount to tacit encouragement of
the crimes. 
Muvunyi was also found responsible as a
superior for the genocidal killing of Tutsi
civilians by ESO soldiers at the Butare
University Hospital, University of Butare,
Beneberika Convent, Mukura forest, and var-
ious roadblocks in Butare. Despite insuffi-
cient evidence to hold Muvunyi individually
responsible for the attacks at these locations,
the attacks widespread nature, high-level
coordination, and proximity to the ESO
camp showed that he knew or should have
known about them. As Muvunyi failed to take
steps to prevent or punish his subordinates for
these crimes, he bore superior responsibility
for genocide. 
In finding Muvunyi guilty of direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, the
Trial Chamber adopted Akayesu’s elaboration
of the elements of “direct” and “public.” The
“direct” element requires “more than a vague
or indirect suggestion of incitement,” thus
implying that the expression must specifically
provoke another to engage in criminal con-
duct.  The Trial Chamber noted that cultural
and linguistic factors, the nature of the audi-
ence, and whether the message was immedi-
ately understood by the audience are impor-
tant considerations in making this
determination. With regard to the “public”
element, the Chamber took into account “the
place where the incitement occurred and
whether attendance was selective or limited.”
The number of listeners and the medium by
which the message is communicated may also
indicate whether the incitement was public.
The Trial Chamber’s finding of guilt was
primarily based on two public meetings of
Hutu civilians at which Muvunyi likened
Tutsis to “snakes” and “poisonous agents” and
associated them with the wartime enemy.
Such characterizations during a time of inter-
ethnic killing, and contextualized within the
Rwandan language and culture, were found
tantamount to condemning members of the
Tutsi ethnic group to death. At one of the
meetings, Muvunyi also reprimanded the
bourgmestre of Gikonko for hiding a Tutsi
man named Vincent Nkurikiyinka, and
demanded that he be brought forward to be
killed. As a result, the man was produced and
killed by the mob. The Trial Chamber con-
cluded that these facts satisfied the “direct”
and “public” elements of the charge.
Moreover, Muvunyi had the requisite mental
intent for the crime, as he knew his audience
would understand the implication of his
words and intended his words to provoke
genocide.
The Trial Chamber also found Muvunyi
guilty as a superior for the crime against
humanity of other inhumane acts. Muvunyi
had knowledge that his subordinates engaged
in inhumane treatment including the mis-
treatment of individuals at the Économat
General, the Butare Cathedral, and at the
ESO camp; the humiliation two Tutsi women
at Butare roadblocks; and the beating of Tutsi
civilians at Beneberika Covent and Groupe
scolaire. Despite having available material and
human resources at the ESO camp, Muvunyi
failed to take necessary and reasonable meas-
ures to prevent or punish the soldiers for these
actions. 
Finally, the Trial Court found Muvunyi
not guilty of either individual or superior
responsibility for the crime against humanity
of rape. The evidence proved that Tutsi
women as young as 17 years old were raped in
the Butare and Gikongoro prefectures during
the period in question. However, it did not
support the specific allegation in the indict-
ment that Ngoma Camp soldiers and
Interahamwe militia members committed the
rapes. Instead, it showed that ESO soldiers
were responsible. Although the Prosecutor’s
pre-trial brief and opening statement
attempted to cure this omission by alleging
the responsibility of ESO soldiers for these
crimes, the Trial Chamber found that “the
Accused did not have the opportunity to defend
himself against such a fundamentally different
case.” As a consequence, the Trial Chamber
found Muvunyi not guilty on this count. 
Notably, just prior to trial, without expla-
nation the Prosecution had sought to amend
the indictment and withdraw the rape charge
in its entirety. The Trial Chamber denied the
request, noting that the Defense had likely
expended time and resources defending the
charge, and that questions of double jeopardy
and judicial economy merited against dis-
missal. Considering the substantial evidence
the Prosecution brought forward proving that
rapes indeed occurred, it is unclear why it did
not seek instead to amend the indictment to
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name ESO soldiers as the perpetrators of the
rapes. 
In determining Muvunyi’s sentence, the
Trial Chamber considered as an aggravating
factor Muvunyi’s failure to exercise his duty to
protect the community and his selective exer-
cise of authority to save civilian lives. As mit-
igating factors, the Trial Chamber noted that,
with the exception of the incitement convic-
tion, the Prosecution failed to prove that
Muvunyi was present for, gave direct orders to
commit, or directly participated in or encour-
aged the crimes of which he was convicted.
The Trial Chamber also considered Muvunyi’s
good character prior to 1994, the fact that he
spent a good portion of his life in the service
of his country, and the lack of evidence that
he had ever previously discriminated on the
basis of ethnicity.
International Criminal Court
ICC Assembly of States Parties 
The Fifth Session of the Assembly of
States Parties (ASP) to the International
Criminal Court (ICC) opened in The Hague
on November 23, 2006. As the management
oversight and legislative body of the ICC, the
full ASP meets annually to make important
decisions regarding the judicial and adminis-
trative activities of the Court for the following
year. The ASP is composed of representatives
of ICC States Parties. The Fifth Session
addressed seven issues: adoption of the 2007
budget, the Court’s Strategic Plan, election of
the Board of Directors for the Trust Fund for
Victims, the draft headquarters agreement
with the Netherlands, permanent premises for
the Court, the Special Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression, and the 2009 Review
Conference. Budgetary issues and the
Strategic Plan generated the most discussion. 
The debate over the 2007 budget focused
on proposed cuts in areas such as funding for
witness protection, investigations, outreach
and communication, and the Court’s projects
for achieving cooperation with States and par-
ties involved in investigations. States and non-
governmental organization (NGO) partici-
pants argued that the proposed budget
provided insufficient resources for expert sup-
port to investigative teams that interview wit-
nesses, legal aid for defense counsel, and
financial assistance for victims’ representa-
tives. States debated whether to accept the
budget proposal as a package, or to decide on
specific budget items separately. The ASP
concluded with a compromise that adopted
the proposed budget except for the cuts to
outreach and communication. It also required
that the Court absorb costs related to its vic-
tim and witness programs.
Similar concerns surfaced in the debate
over the Court’s Strategic Plan. Pursuant to a
2004 request by the Committee on Budget
and Finance, the Court formulated a Strategic
Plan. Through this Plan, the Court sought to
identify concrete steps to ensure that victims
and witnesses participated extensively, as well
as to increase cooperation with and awareness
of its activities. It presented a revised version
to the ASP members prior to the Fifth
Session. The Plan emphasized the importance
of three core goals: achieving impartial inves-
tigations, quality prosecutions, and fair and
expeditious trial proceedings. Human rights
NGOs and States supportive of the ICC have
repeatedly criticized the Strategic Plan’s failure
to focus strongly enough on maximizing the
ICC’s impact on local communities affected
by the crimes and possessing an interest in the
Court’s investigations.
These critics argued that the Plan fails to
ensure victim participation, education, pro-
tection, and reparations. NGOs participating
in the ASP stated that the absence of a con-
stant ICC staff presence in Uganda and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has
created public distrust in the ICC by creating
a lack of information and preventing interac-
tion with Court personnel. Some NGOs rec-
ommended an increased ICC in-country
presence, more visits by top Court officials,
construction of ICC field offices, and a possi-
ble move toward on site judicial proceedings.
Other NGOs called for an improved outreach
and communications approach tailoring
strategies to each situation under investiga-
tion or prosecution, and prioritizing engage-
ment with local communities. 
The ASP concluded with four main reso-
lutions. Aside from acceptance of the budget,
the States Parties resolved to continue dia-
logue on the Strategic Plan and try to resolve
the issues raised. The ASP also made decisions
involving the permanent premises for the
Court and strengthening the ICC in terms of
State cooperation, cooperation with the UN,
and outreach. The Resumed Fifth Session
began in New York on January 29, 2007. It
continued discussions on the Crime of
Aggression and Board of Directors elections
for the Trust Fund for Victims.
United States and the ICC
In September 2006, Congress amended
the American Servicemembers Protection Act
(ASPA) in the Fiscal Year 2007 Defense
Authorization Bill. The amendment strikes a
provision conditioning International Military
Education and Training (IMET) aid on recip-
ient states agreement to form Bilateral
Immunity Agreements (BIAs) with the U.S.
On October 2, 2006, President George Bush
also waived the conditions for twenty-one
countries. 
Originally passed in 2002, ASPA condi-
tions U.S. IMET aid to certain ICC States
Parties’ on their agreement to grant U.S. ser-
vice members immunity from ICC investiga-
tions or prosecutions. When a country signs a
BIA with the U.S., it agrees not to surrender
U.S. personnel, including service members,
nationals, and non-nationals working with
the U.S., to the ICC. The U.S. refers to the
BIAs as “Article 98 agreements,” in reference
to Article 98 of the Rome Statute. Article 98
prevents the Court from proceeding with a
request for an individual’s surrender if the
request would require the sending State to
violate previously negotiated treaties with the
individual’s state of nationality. International
lawyers, the ICC, and states that have refused
to sign BIAs argue that Article 98 applies only
to previously existing Status of Forces
Agreements. They argue that the U.S. inter-
pretation of the article is not only incorrect,
but a violation of the ICC States Parties’ obli-
gation to arrest and surrender perpetrators
when so requested by the Court.
U.S. legislators and executive branch offi-
cials have begun to realize that withholding
IMET aid from strategically important allies
undercuts U.S. foreign policy goals. Much of
the IMET aid was cut from programs
intended to fight terrorism, narcotics traffick-
ing, and corruption. John Bellinger, chief
legal advisor to U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, has argued that imposing
BIAs undermines U.S. foreign policy objec-
tives, and Secretary Rice recently stated that
the US is “shooting itself in the foot” with its
ICC-BIA policy. While relenting on ASPA’s
IMET restrictions, the U.S. still withholds
Economic Support Funds (ESF) from non-
exempt ICC States Parties that refuse to sign
BIAs. ESF aid includes funds for poverty alle-
viation, development of democratic gover-
nance, and rule of law programs. The
Nethercutt Amendment, added to the
Foreign Operations Appropriation Bill in
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2004, prohibits ESF from being disbursed to
many countries in need of development assis-
tance. President Bush recently waived ESF
cuts for fourteen countries, but human rights
groups are calling for a complete repeal of the
Nethercutt Amendment.
Update on Situations
On January 29, 2007, Pre-Trial Chamber
I held a public hearing where it confirmed
charges against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, for-
mer leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots
and the first suspect held in ICC custody.
Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo has
charged Lubanga with individual criminal
responsibility for the war crimes of enlisting,
conscripting, and using children in the con-
duct of hostilities. Presiding Judge Claude
Jorda read the decision, which the Court
reached after confirmation of charges hearings
held November 9–28, 2006. Moreno-
Ocampo predicts the trial will commence
later this year. While Court officials lauded
the proceedings as a milestone in interna-
tional criminal justice, human rights groups
continue to criticize the Prosecutor for failing
to indict Lubanga for other crimes, including
murder, rape, and torture, and for failing to
issue arrest warrants for the other parties to
the conflict. 
The debate termed “peace vs. justice” per-
sists in Uganda, where peace talks between the
rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by
indicted leader Joseph Kony, and the
Ugandan government have continued to stall.
Uganda referred the situation involving this
conflict to the ICC in 2003 and arrest war-
rants were issued against LRA leaders in 2005.
Kony has previously stated that the LRA
refuses to negotiate unless the ICC drops all
charges against its leadership, but the
Government of Uganda has refused to accept
those conditions. The peace talks have been
conducted in the Sudanese town of Juba since
July 2006. After Sudanese President Omar
Hassan al-Bashir stated on January 9, 2007,
that the LRA was no longer welcome in
Sudan, the LRA announced that it refuses to
negotiate unless the talks are moved to a more
neutral state. The LRA contends that Sudan’s
Khartoum government and the ICC are
biased toward the Government of Uganda.
Compounding matters, human rights groups
continue to urge the Prosecutor to investigate
other parties to the conflict, such as individu-
als in the Ugandan government.
In his December 14, 2006, report to the
Security Council, the Prosecutor announced
his office had almost completed its investiga-
tion into the crimes in Darfur, Sudan. The
investigation focused on serious crimes that
took place in 2003 and 2004, and the individ-
uals bearing the greatest responsibility for the
commission of those crimes. The Prosecutor
stated that the investigation has produced suf-
ficient evidence to identify specific individu-
als committing crimes against humanity and
war crimes, including rape, murder, persecu-
tion, and torture. The ICC may only exercise
jurisdiction if a national government is
unwilling or unable to conduct prosecutions
of alleged perpetrators of crimes within the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Moreno-
Ocampo reported that the Khartoum govern-
ment’s purported effort to conduct national
prosecutions fails to address the gravest crimes
of interest to the ICC. The prosecutorial staff
visited Khartoum in January 2007 to gather
information on reports that fourteen individ-
uals had been arrested for committing serious
international crimes. Moreno-Ocampo plans
to submit his case to the Pre-Trial Chamber in
February 2007. HRB
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